



## Pluribiological Cosmopolitanism and More-than-Human Societies

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### ABSTRACT

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In this essay, I discuss the notions of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism from an interspecies perspective. I propose the concept of "pluribiologism" as an alternative to Western multiculturalism and to the multinaturalism that anthropologists such as Eduardo Viveiros de Castro identify in the Amerindian peoples of the Amazon. Pluribiologism is the basis for interspecies societies and for the concept of the rights of nature, which has been developed and introduced into the legal systems of many Amazonian countries. I offer examples of the rights of nature and of its consequences within nation-states. In the final section of the essay, I outline the notion of a pluribiological cosmopolitanism from an interspecies perspective and suggest ways for humans to establish peaceful relations with more-than-human beings.

**Keywords:** pluribiologism, cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, pluribiological cosmopolitanism, interspecies perspective

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## Multiculturalism and Interspecies Cosmopolitanism

Contemporary political discourse has struggled to accommodate the coexistence of people and communities from disparate backgrounds in a shared space. The homogeneity of nation-states—itself a fictional construct, an “imagined community,” in the words of Benedict Anderson (2016), predicated upon a given society’s common history, culture, language, religion, and so on—has given way to the acknowledgment of difference within a country’s borders from the second half of the twentieth century onwards. Canada, with a significant French-speaking minority and a long tradition of immigration, was the first state to adopt multiculturalism as an official policy in the 1970s, in a bid to promote peaceful relations between members of various social groups. Other countries, from Australia to Sweden, quickly followed this move.

At the international level, political philosophy has long been concerned with the means to ensure the peaceful coexistence of disparate nations. The Enlightenment, with its faith in rationality and the progressive betterment of humanity, witnessed the formulation of several projects for international peace, from the Abbé de Saint Pierre’s proposal for peace in Europe to Immanuel Kant’s famous essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1795), to which we will return later. Kantian cosmopolitanism has been taken up, in one way or another, by various contemporary political philosophers, including, among many others, Jürgen Habermas and Martha Nussbaum, persuaded by the promise of peace between all countries.

The main criticism leveled against both multicultural and cosmopolitan ideas is well-known. Multiculturalism is based upon a predefined conception of what an individual and a citizen are, namely, independent and rational human beings who abide by what are considered to be just laws within a state. The “culture” in multiculturalism becomes nothing more than a superficial phenomenon, a matter of personal preference at roughly the same level as one’s choice of colors for clothing or predilection for this or that culinary dish. Different cultures are tolerated precisely because they do not interfere with the fundamental values of neo-liberal societies. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, for cosmopolitanism. Similar to multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism presupposes a pre-given understanding of what a state and international relations are. It assumes that there is *one* cosmos, a common vision of what the cosmos is, shared by all those who take part in a cosmopolitan world.

The cracks in the multicultural and cosmopolitan edifices become apparent when a community questions the basic assumptions that both concepts take for granted. What if a certain group decides that religion should be an integral part of the state, thus threatening post-industrial societies’ views on secularism? And what happens when the Western paradigm of the cosmos—which meant, in Ancient Greek, a shining order or an orderly arrangement of things—is challenged by

alternative (for instance, Indigenous) understandings of what the world is, of what an orderly/ordered earth should look like?

In short, it is difficult to consider alternatives to multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism that take into account the main criticisms levelled against these concepts, and to establish forms of peaceful coexistence between human communities, both within nation-states and at the international level. My aim in this article is to deepen this discussion, broadening it from an intraspecies context (that is to say, from a debate on how to organize societies of human beings) to an interspecies context that concerns the relations between different forms of existence. Reflections on living in common have focused primarily on the bonds between humans. However, the current ecological crisis leads us to rethink the very notion of community—of a way of living in common and of the life we have in common with other beings—to encompass not only *Homo sapiens* but also more-than-human forms of existence. In what follows, I reflect upon the notion of living in common and consider not only intra- but also interspecies communities.

### **More-than-Human Communities**

Several thinkers have already discussed the contours of hybrid societies. French philosopher Dominique Lestel (2007), for instance, has described what he calls “hybrid” communities that encompass both humans and animals living together in close proximity and often developing symbiotic relations (pp. 93-98). He questions the divide separating domesticated from wild animals, and even animals from human beings, and points out that the process of domestication often goes both ways: animals are domesticated and adapt to humanity, but humans also undergo a process of adjustment, learning to live with the animals that share their homes. It is symptomatic, however, that Lestel’s examples of hybrid communities are drawn almost exclusively from anthropological research that focuses on smaller communities. While some animals may have occupied key positions in pre-modern societies, with the development of complex agricultural civilizations and, later, with the onset of industrialization, humans have become increasingly cut off from other living beings. Animals today are mostly regarded as a means to an end: food, clothing, recreation, and so on. The fact that *some* animals are praised—the cow in Hindu culture or pet dogs and cats in the West, for example—makes them an exception to the rule of routine instrumentalization of more than humans. What is more, Lestel mentions only animals—and he is most likely thinking of the most culturally significant animals like some mammals, birds, and the odd reptile— as part of his hybrid communities. What is the place of plants or fungi, and other forms of existence, in this framework?

Conceptualizations of hybrid communities, such as Lestel’s, remain tied to an anthropocentric view of what a community is. The human remains the focal point and the measure of our definition of commonality. In my view, the attempt to carve out a formulation of the commons that, as far as possible, escapes the

pitfalls of anthropocentrism—and I say “as far as possible” because any such conceptualization remains tied to anthropocentric presuppositions, if only by the fact that it is the product of humanity—departs from an ecological reflection, in the original sense of the term. I am referring to an ecology that goes back to the Ancient Greek etymology of the word—coined by German biologist Ernst Haeckel in the nineteenth century<sup>2</sup>—as a *logos*, or discourse, about the *oikos*, or our common home, the planet earth. Interspecies communities are those that share a common *oikos* and, in order to think about them, we have to develop a new *logos*, a new language that includes human modes of expression but moves beyond them to encompass more-than-human forms of articulation, in other words, a *zoophytology* and a *zoophytography*. I have discussed the notion of *zoophytography* at length elsewhere, so I will not go into an in-depth analysis of the topic here.<sup>3</sup> In short, I understand *zoophytology* as a discourse where plants, animals, and other forms of existence inscribe themselves in human thought, while I regard *zoophytography*, more broadly, as the articulation of animals and plants that leave traces of themselves in human culture.

A *zoophytographical* view of interspecies communities that recognizes the imprint left by more than humans in human discourses and practices entails considering what humans have in common with other beings. Theorists of the notion of community have long tried to pinpoint the roots of communality, which they often trace back not to the fullness of a shared property or possession but, rather, to the partaking of an absence or a deficiency. Italian theorist Roberto Esposito advances a notion of community based upon a “lack, a limit that is configured as an onus” (2010, p. 6). Those who belong to a given community, then, are the ones who experience the same sense of inadequacy or indebtedness. Philosopher Alphonso Lingis goes even further than Esposito and postulates a “community of those who have nothing in common.” Following in the footsteps of Martin Heidegger, Lingis regards death as the only possible common denominator between people who can otherwise be widely different. What unites the members of a community is their “being-toward-death,” in other words, the frailty of existence. The “lack” or “inadequacy” that Esposito mentions in his texts could be interpreted, in this context, as the inability to live perpetually, and the indebtedness he discusses is a debt to life itself that allows beings to exist.

While philosophers such as Esposito and Lingis focus exclusively on human communities, their thought can be extended to encompass more than humans. In other words, interspecies co-existence—or, better still, “convivência,” a Portuguese word meaning co-living that has no direct English translation—begins with

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<sup>2</sup> The term ecology was coined by Ernst Haeckel in German as “Ökologie,” drawing on the Ancient Greek words *oikos* and *logos* in his books *Generelle Morphologie der Organismen: Allgemeine Grundzüge der Organischen Formen; Wissenschaft, Mechanisch Begründet durch die von Charles Darwin Reformierte Deszendenz-Theorie*, published in 1866.

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed definition of the concept of zoophygraphy, see Vieira “*Phytographia*,” 209-216 and Vieira “Amazonian Ecopoetics,” 56-57.

existence, with the bare fact of our being alive or, more basic still, of our being-there in the world. Members of an interspecies community who have, otherwise, nothing in common share the frailty of material and bodily existence that will one day cease to be. I would argue that the transience of existence is, paradoxically, the most secure foundation for forging lasting interspecies ties. *Zoophytography* is grounded on life's inscription in the world and from the articulation of beings' existence while alive, which transpires in human culture.

What happens to the concepts of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism when considered from the perspective of interspecies communities, communities of those who may have nothing in common but the fact of being ephemeral? Are these notions the most appropriate ones to discuss interspecies relations?

### **Multinaturalism and Pluribiologism**

I take the work of Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro as a point of departure in the search for a theoretical framework appropriate to reflect upon interspecies communities. Viveiros de Castro, who studied Indigenous societies from the Amazon region, delineates the main differences separating their views on interspecies relations from those prevalent in Western culture. “[...]if there is a virtually universal Amerindian notion,” he writes, “it is that of an original state of undifferentiation between humans and animals, described in mythology. Myths are filled with beings whose form, name and behaviour inextricably mix human and animal attributes in a common context of intercommunicability [...]” (1998, p. 471). Western thought posits the unity of nature that encompasses the bodies of plants, animals, and humans, all subject to the same mechanistic laws, and a multiplicity of human cultures, a view that has multiculturalism as one of its latest avatars. Amerindians, to the contrary, presuppose a spiritual unity of all beings and corporeal diversity, an ontology that Castro defines as “multinatural” (2004, p. 466). For Amerindians, humanity is the common condition of both humans and more than humans, given that all beings possess a similar soul or spirit, a universal given: “For Amazonian peoples, *the original common condition of both humans and animals is not animality but, rather, humanity*. The great separation reveals not so much culture distinguishing itself from nature as nature distancing itself from culture [...]. *Animals are ex-humans (rather than humans, ex-animals)*” (2004, p. 465). The main difference between humans and other entities lies in their bodies, whose differentiation happened *a posteriori* and does not annul the communion of their souls.<sup>4</sup>

Viveiros de Castro's writings on Amerindian thought point to an inversion of the Cartesian philosophy that has served as the basis for the conception of more-

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<sup>4</sup> Other anthropologists working on the Amazon River Basin, including Philippe Descola (2013), define the Amazonian, Indigenous cosmologies as animist, since Amerindian peoples consider that all beings have a soul, or spirit, and differ only in their bodies.

than-human beings since the beginning of Western modernity. As is well known, in the *Meditations of First Philosophy*, Descartes establishes a separation between *res extensa*, which encompasses all physical or material bodies that proliferate in nature, and *res cogitans*, the human mind. For Descartes, more-than-human beings are like machines because they are part of *res extensa*, while humans are divided between *res extensa* (their bodies) and *res cogitans* (their minds). The separation of humans between physicality and spirit or reason has often led to the notion that humanity is at war with its irrational nature—with the body, which it would be necessary to dominate and subjugate, and, consequently, with external nature as a whole. According to Cartesian philosophy, it was thanks to *res cogitans* that humans developed culture, with multiculturalism being an expression of thought that is only tangentially related to the corporeal existence of humanity. Given that, for Descartes, more than humans are machine-like and incapable of self-articulation, *zoophytography* makes little sense in a Cartesian framework.

Translated into a Cartesian vocabulary, Amerindian thought considers that all beings share both *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. For Amerindian peoples, *res cogitans* is the same in both humans and more than humans, and only *res extensa* differs in the various beings, becoming *res extensae*. Viveiros de Castro highlights this when he describes the Amerindian view of the relationships between different entities as multinaturalism: the thought/soul of humans, animals, and plants is the same; it is the constitution of their bodies that is distinct. *Zoophytography*, as the inscription of more-than-human thought and expression in human culture, is thus central for the Amazonian Indigenous imaginary.

The Amerindian conception of multinaturalism avoids some of the pitfalls of Western anthropocentrism. It recognizes, on the one hand, that both humans and more-than-humans have different modes of thought, thus calling into question the exceptionality of *Homo sapiens* as the only thinking entity, which has been one of the cornerstones of the Western philosophical-political tradition. Still, despite being a provocative challenge to Cartesianism, the Amerindian thought described by Viveiros de Castro continues to presuppose a division between body and soul, nature and culture. Multinaturalism operates on the basis of these separations, but extends the sphere of culture to more-than-human entities.

I suggest here another way of conceptualizing the relationships between human beings and other forms of existence that would obviate the division between nature and culture, a compartmentalization that has been discussed and criticized ad nauseam. I propose the term ‘pluribiologism’ as an alternative to both multiculturalism and multinaturalism. Pluribiologism takes into account the ephemeral existence of each being, which is, as we have seen, the basis for the conception of communities of human and more-than-human beings. It acknowledges that there is a multiplicity of entities sharing the same space without systematizing them according to a pre-established hierarchy, as happened, for example, in the medieval *scala naturae*, or ladder of nature, which organized the

natural world according to a pyramidal structure, with God at the top, followed by angels, human beings, animals, plants, minerals, and so on.

Pluribiologism evokes the distinction between *zoe*, or physical life, and *bios*, or life within a socio-political community, which goes back to Classical Greece, in the thought of Aristotle, and which was taken up by contemporary philosophers such as Giorgio Agamben.<sup>5</sup> It recovers the notion of *bios*, or community life, but articulates it with *zoe*, in the sense of biological life. A more-than-human pluribiological community presupposes that each form of existence, human and more-than-human, has its own mode of expression, that it has its own nature and culture, understood as an indissoluble whole. Pluribiologism thus implies both multinaturalism and multiculturalism, but perhaps it is more accurate to say that it makes both multinaturalism and multiculturalism obsolete, insofar as it goes beyond the division between body and spirit, between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. A (future) pluribiological community would lead to a reconfiguration of these categories, since thought would not be separated from corporeality, and physical existence would not be opposed to the mind. A biological entity is both a *res extensa* and a *res cogitans*. Or, better said, it is not a *res* (thing) at all: it is an ephemeral being with a specific mode of existence.

### **Pluribiologism and the Rights of Nature**

One of the consequences of seeing communal relations from a pluribiological perspective is to extend the notion of rights to more-than-human beings. Let us imagine the Tiputini River, where I recently stayed in the Indigenous Kichwa community of Llanchama. The Tiputini is a tributary of the Napo River, which, in turn, is a tributary of the Amazon. The Napo River crosses the Yasuní National Park, at the heart of the Ecuadorian Amazon. Designated a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 1989, Yasuní is one of the most biodiverse regions in the world. Its privileged location at the foothills of the Andes, where high mountain peaks give way to vast plains that stretch all the way to the Atlantic, contributes to the variety of species thriving in its rainforests. What if, beyond being a protected river, because it lies within the Yasuní National Park, the Tiputini were also a legal subject with rights? What if its waters and its banks and the plants and animals living in it were not a property of the Ecuadorian state, of a given community, company, or individual, but were an independent whole? Then the Tiputini would, for instance, be able to sue the state if the oil extraction facilities that proliferate within the Yasuní National Park were to pollute its waters. But one might ask, if the Tiputini River is not a person, can it make decisions and represent itself legally? This question is tied to a debate on the rights of nature that has been spreading to various nations and that was spearheaded by Amazonian countries, many of which have already enshrined the notion of rights of nature within their legal systems.

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Homo Sacer*, passim.

It is not a coincidence that Amazonian and Andean countries have pioneered the integration of the rights of nature in their legal systems. The strong presence of Indigenous peoples in these regions was a decisive factor in changing the legal understanding of nature. As we saw in the first part of this article, for Indigenous peoples, plants, animals, and other entities (rivers, mountains, etc.) are a key part of their social and even family lives and are understood as beings with their own intentionality and subjectivity that are an integral part of Indigenous communities. As Esperanza Martínez, an Ecuadorian lawyer and Indigenous and environmental rights activist, puts it, the notion of rights of nature results from a combination of Indigenous conceptions of the natural world and the Western language of rights. For Martínez, who was a decisive player in the inclusion of the rights of nature in the constitution of Ecuador, this legal solution cannot be seen as a panacea to solve all environmental problems. The rights of nature are a compromise solution, using the tools activists and Indigenous peoples currently have at their disposal to fight against the rampant extractivism in the Amazon and other Indigenous lands.

The notion of rights of nature is not merely about the protection of certain living beings, such as specific animals, for instance, those kept as pets. Nor is it simply about the definition of environmental crimes, something that is already part of the vast majority of legal systems. The rights of nature go beyond this and establish that the natural world as a whole, or certain natural entities, such as the Tiputini River, for example, are subjects of rights, regardless of their relation to human beings. This notion decentralizes humanity as the only source of rights and recognizes the intrinsic value of the natural world, beyond economic considerations. It acknowledges that communities are composed of human and more-than-human beings and seeks to translate *zoophytographic* discourse through the juridical language of rights. How does this work in practice?

Ecuador was the first country in the world to recognize in its 2008 Constitution that nature has inalienable rights. The section “Rights of Nature” (article 71) from this Constitution states that “Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life reproduces itself and comes to fruition, has the right to existence, maintenance, and regeneration of its vital cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes.” The Constitution further indicates that “any person, community, people or nationality can demand from public authorities the respect for the rights of nature” and it adds that “the State should encourage people, legal entities and collectives to protect nature.” This means that it is up to each citizen, as well as public and private entities, to fight for the rights of the natural world. The State also has the responsibility to restore nature in the case of environmental disasters (article 72) and to restrict activities that might destroy ecosystems or change natural cycles (article 73).

Following in the footsteps of Ecuador, Bolivia issued in 2010 the “Law of the Rights of Mother Earth.” According to this law, the earth becomes a collective subject of public interest (article 5), having, among others, the right to life, diversity

of life, water, clean air, balance, restoration, and to live free from contamination (article 7). This law also creates an ombudsperson of Mother Earth, whose function is to ensure the development, dissemination of, and respect for the rights of nature.

Colombia also recognizes that the natural world has rights, but it followed a path different from that of Ecuador and Bolivia: it ascribed rights to certain regions and biomes within the country. In 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court recognized the Atrato River, which reaches the Atlantic Ocean in the Caribbean, as a subject of rights. It determined that a legal representative should be responsible for upholding the interests of this body of water. Two years later, the Colombian Amazon was also recognized by the Court as a subject of rights. The Court determined the creation of an Intergenerational Pact for the Life of the Colombian Amazon to eradicate deforestation in the region.

Similar to what happened in Amazonian countries, New Zealand has also recognized the rights of certain elements of the natural world, under pressure from the native Māori Indigenous population. In 2017, the New Zealand government attributed legal rights to the whole of the Whanganui River, including all its physical and metaphysical elements. In the same year, it recognized Mount Taranaki, which is considered sacred by the Māori people from the North Island of the country, as a subject of rights. Already in 2014, New Zealand had taken a first step in recognizing the rights of nature by extinguishing the Te Urewera National Park, famous for its forests and lakes and the ancestral home to the Māori Tuhoe people. Te Urewera has since then stopped being a national park and a property of the state and has become an independent legal entity.

As a response to increasing environmental degradation throughout the planet, various other countries or regions have been adopting some form of rights of nature in their legal systems. In 2017, the City of Mexico enshrined the rights of nature as part of its Constitution. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh gave legal rights, including the right to life, to all rivers in the country in 2019. In the same year, Uganda passed its new National Environmental Law that recognizes the fundamental rights of nature to be, to have a habitat, to develop, and to regenerate. In the United States, the rights of nature are part of the legal system of various states, including Ohio, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota, even though there is still no federal law on this issue. In 2022, Spain passed a law granting rights and legal personhood to the Mar Menor saltwater lagoon, which was upheld by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2024.

The rights of nature are key to changing the way people conceive of the natural world. The idea that nature has rights emphasizes that rivers, mountains, and other entities are not a mere collection of things to be appropriated by individuals or corporations. These beings have a right to exist, like us humans, and are an integral part of communal life with their own modes of expression. This is something that Latin American Indigenous peoples have known all along. For

Amerindian peoples, a balanced relationship with plants, animals, and other entities—a relationship based on a process of exchange and negotiation between equal partners—is central to what they call “buen vivir” (the good life or good living). Granting rights to more-than-human entities is based on the principle that a community is an interspecies, multi-biological group and that life in common requires recognition of the intrinsic worth of each human and more-than-human entity.

Beyond a change in mindset, the rights of nature, influenced by an Indigenous understanding of the natural world, are also effecting concrete change throughout the world. Based upon the rights of nature enshrined in the Ecuadorian Constitution, for instance, the country’s Constitutional Court ruled on May 9, 2023 in favor of a petition brought before the nation’s justice system by the Yasunidos environmental NGO for a national referendum to take place to decide on whether oil should be indefinitely kept on the ground in Yasuní National Park.

Oil extraction began in Ecuador in 1972, and Yasuní is at the epicenter of oil drilling, having about 40% of the country’s oil reserves in the Ishpingo-Tiputini-Tambococha (ITT) area, where the Tiputini River flows. Ecuadorian environmental activists devised a plan to keep oil reserves on the ground in ITT, also known as block 43 of Yasuní, a project that was taken up in 2007 by the then-president Rafael Correa. The idea was to create a fund worth 3.6 billion American dollars, roughly half of the estimated value of the underground oil in the area, to compensate the country for stopping oil drilling. When the scheme collapsed for lack of funding, President Correa reopened the area for oil extraction, with disastrous consequences for local human and more-than-human beings. Oil spills are frequent, polluting the rivers’ waters and contaminating plants and animals, which exponentially increases the incidence of diseases such as cancer among Indigenous people living in the region. Roads cut across the rainforest to transport oil encourage settlers to flock to the territory, which, in turn, leads to illegal logging and hunting, including of endangered species to be sold as commodities in a global market.

Following the May 9 Constitutional Court decision to put oil drilling in Yasuní to a referendum, the fate of the National Park and of the Tiputini River may be about to change. In a landmark vote on August 20, 2023, the people of Ecuador decided against oil drilling in the region by a margin of nearly 20%, which means that all crude extraction activities need to stop in Yasuní. This decision will have a direct impact on the Tiputini river and on the community of Llanchama I visited not so long ago. The Indigenous inhabitants of Llanchama will be able to continue living in their ancestral lands, free from crude oil pollution. They will go on narrating their stories about the ties binding plants, animals, and humans, as an implicit form of resistance against the ravages of extractivism in the Amazon.

### **Pluribiological Cosmopolitanism**

The rights of nature reflect a pluribiological view of communal life at the level of nation-state legislation. How would relations among states change if we

were to replace multiculturalism with pluribiologism? If intra-community, multi-species relations were based on pluribiologism supported by the rights of nature, what would inter-community ties between different societies be like on a planetary level? Or, to address the issue differently, what would be the contours of cosmopolitanism in pluribiological societies?

To answer this question, we return to Immanuel Kant's text, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay." Based on Stoic cosmopolitan thought, the German philosopher established the basic principles for later reflections on cosmopolitanism. For Kant, cosmopolitan law is based on "the common possession of the earth" or "the right to the surface of the earth that the human race shares in common" (2008, p.106). More-than-human pluribiological cosmopolitanism would imply extending this cosmopolitan law to more-than-human beings, recognizing that humans and more-than-humans have common possession of the earth and the right to occupy it. Or, going even further, it would mean renouncing the concept of possession altogether and seeing every entity, living or non-living—animals, plants, but also rivers, mountains, and so on—as entities with rights that together form pluribiological communities. The world republic—the Kantian *Weltrepublik*—of cosmopolitanism would thus necessarily include more-than-human beings, that is, it would be a pluribiological res-public, or rather, a *res-bios* (Vieira 2020, p.8).

While, as we have seen, countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia or New Zealand, have already begun to take the first steps in an effort to recognize more-than-human beings as subjects of law within these nations, the rights of more-than-humans do not yet figure in the context of international relations, which are dominated by nation-states. In a pluribiological cosmopolitanism, the very notion of the cosmos would be the subject of debate, as Bruno Latour rightly pointed out, since it would have different meanings for the various humans and more than humans that make up cosmopolitan communities. Cosmopolitanism would become, in the words of Isabelle Stengers, a "cosmopolitics," a debate about what the cosmos really is for various entities. We could consider the creation of a world parliament that would include air, water, land, energy, and all living beings, following the proposal of Michel Serres (2009, p.40; p.51). This cosmopolitan pluribiological parliament would have to consider the fact that different beings have a variety of modes of thinking and articulate their existence in many ways. To avoid a reductive anthropocentrism, it would be necessary to adopt a zoophytology, a language that would include the forms of expression of animals, plants, and other forms of existence. More-than-human pluribiological cosmopolitanism would be the result of a debate among the members of this parliament, a debate for which we would have to create appropriate language and procedures. This cosmopolitan

res-bios would be a first step in the long human process of learning to live peacefully with the other beings with whom humanity shares the planet.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Parts of this paragraph are adapted from the final paragraph of my article "Interspecies Peace: Learning to Live Together."

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